




















COMPARE [ N / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MECHISDM
9100
INPUT/OUTPUT SHAFT - HOUSING
H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.













COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MECH/SDM
9100
INPUT/OUTPUT SHAFT - HOUSING
H. J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ ] IN] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]





NEW [ X ]
MECH/SDM
9101




















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]





N_ [ X ]
MECH/SDM
9101
















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CILAND IOAANAL¥SES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.











NEW [ X ]
MECH/SDM
9100
INPUT/OUTPUT SHAFT - HOUSING




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
CO.ARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.














NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL. SEE MDAC ID 6211 FOR EFFECTS AND
RATIONALE.



















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL. SEE MDAC ID 6211 FOR EFFECTS AND
RATIONALE.



















W. T ° SLAUGHTER
NASA [ 1 /i ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [







[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH FMEA/CIL.
ix]
[ ]



















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH FMEA/CIL. SEE RELATED MDAC ID 6213.
[ ]
[ ]














NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]














[ ] [ ] [ ] [x]*
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA DOES NOT AGREE WITH FMEA/CIL.
FOR STRUCTURAL FAILURE OTHER THAN BINDING/JAMMING LINKAGE WOULD
PROBABLY BE BROKEN/DISCONNECTED IN A "FAILS FREE" MODE. IN THIS
CASE REMAINING ACTUATOR/CRANK SHOULD DRIVE THE PANEL TO THE STOW
STATE.














NASA [ 2 /IR ]







COMPARE [ N / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH FMEA/CIL.
IX]
[ ]























COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ]
B C
[F] [P]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
[x]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 02-4G-154-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C




COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH FMEA/CIL.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]














NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]










NEW [ X ]
A B












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
[ ]
[ ]














NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]













[ 1 [ ]
[ ] [ ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 02-4G-155-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
[ ]
[ ]
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N/ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
[ ]
[ ]



















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
N_A [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[X]*
[ ]
COMPARE [ N/ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
[x]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 02-4G-157-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






BEARING, TORQUE SHAFT SUPPORT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
[X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.
[x]
[ ]














NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]






W. T • SLAUGHTER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
[x]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 02-4G-176-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: WoT. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES NOT AGREE WITH FMEA/CIL.
WORSE CASE FAILURE WOULD BE LOSS OF ABILITY TO RELEASE/LATCH A
LATCH PAIR. THIS WILL NOT AFFECT MISSION CONTINUANCE AND SHOULD
BE CRITICALITY THREE (3).














NASA [ 3 /IR ]







COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ F ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
IOA AGREES WITH FMEA/CIL.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
















NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ 1 [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
C ]
[ ]
















NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
W.T. SLAUGHTER
COMPARE [ N / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
C P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
[x]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 02-4G-181-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LATCH TORQUE SHAFT ASSEMBLY




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
[ ]
[ ]














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]









[ P ] [ NA]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA DOES NOT AGREE WITH FMEA/CIL.
SHOULD BE A CRITICALITY THREE (3) AS THE LOSS OF ABILITY TO LATCH
A SINGLE LATCH PAIR SHOULD NOT AFFECT MISSION CONTINUANCE.




ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-6 II2A
NASA FMEA # : 02-4G-182-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]















NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IX] *
[ ]







_S: (If different from NASA)
/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




RITICALITY THREE (3) AS THE LOSS OF ABILITY TO LATCH






NASA FMEA #: 02-4G-183-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES NOT AGREE WITH FMEA/CIL.
FAILURE TO ENGAGE OF OUR TORQUE LIMITER RESULTS IN LOSS OF ROTARY
INPUT OF ONE DRIVE MOTOR. OTHER DRIVE MOTOR SHOULD EFFECT
RELEASE/LATCH STATE IN SINGLE MOTOR DRIVE TIME. SHOULD BE A
CRITICALITY THREE (3) AS MISSION CONTINUANCE NOT AFFECTED.






























[ F ] [ F ]








[ x ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
REE )NS: (If different from NASA)
/ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
[ ]
[ ]














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]





NEW [ X ]
MECH/PBR
16514








[ P ] [ F ]
[ P ] [ F ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH FMEA/CIL.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]














NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
ix]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 02-4G-301-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH MODULE, LIMIT, RADIATOR STOWED




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
IX]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-65G-2001-01
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LATCH CONTROL SWITCH ($4/$6)
LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL. ALSO SEE RELATED MDAC ID's 6502,
6503, 6504.





NASA FMEA #: 05-65G-2001-01
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LATCH CONTROL SWITCH ($4/$6)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL. ALSO SEE RELATED MDAC ID's 6501,
6503, 6504.





NASA FMEA #: 05-65G-2001-01
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






LATCH CONTROL SWITCH ($4/$6)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N/ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL. ALSO SEE RELATED MDAC ID's 6501,
6502, 6504.














LATCH CONTROL SWITCH ($4/$6)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL. ALSO SEE RELATED MDAC ID's 6501,
6502, 6503.















NEW [ X ]
MECH/VDM
8107
MICROSWITCH POSITION INDICATOR, ACTUATOR
H. J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CILAND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6AB-2026A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MICROSWITCH POSITION INDICATOR, ACTUATOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CILAND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]




























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.















NEW [ X ]
MECH/VDM
8107
MICROSWITCH POSITION INDICATOR, ACTUATOR
H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6AB-2027-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MICROSWITCH POSITION INDICATOR, ACTUATOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6AB-2027-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE C / ] C ] [ N ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.













NEW [ X ]
MECH/VDM
8107
MICROSWITCH POSITION INDICATOR, ACTUATOR
H. J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6AB-2028
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MICROSWITCH POSITION INDICATOR, ACTUATOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.



















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.















NEW [ X ]
MECH/VDM
8107
MICROSWITCH POSITION INDICATOR, ACTUATOR
H. J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6AB-2029-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MICROSWITCH POSITION INDICATOR, ACTUATOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTILRESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6AB-2029-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.















NEW [ X ]
MECH/VDM
8107
MICROSWITCH POSITION INDICATOR, ACTUATOR
H. J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6AB-2030A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MICROSWITCH POSITION INDICATOR, ACTUATOR




NDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]




























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6AB-2031A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MICROSWITCH POSITION INDICATOR, ACTUATOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6AB-2031A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MICROSWITCH POSITION INDICATOR, ACTUATOR
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HOWlnmC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ I ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CILAND IOAANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]




























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.




ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8503 B






MCA AC POWER RELAY




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOa [ 2 /IR ]




























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CILAND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]




























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6AB-2130-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MCA AC POWER RELAY




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.



















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]




























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.











MCA AC POWER RELAY




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / 3 [ ] [ N 3 [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6AB-2138-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]




























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]




























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6AB-2201-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]




























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]




























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]




























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CILAND IOAANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.



















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If appllcable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6AB-2202-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / 3 [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6AB-2202-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





















NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
MPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
[ x] *
IX]
COMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
:MARKS:
,A AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
[E DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
: AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
O_AL PA_E IS
OF PO0_ QUALFI'y














NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]




























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ Y ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE C / ] C ] C N ] C ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMAR/(S:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6AB-2204-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6AB-2252-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.











CONTROL BUS 1.2K RESISTOR
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CILAND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.













NEW [ X ]
MECH/PBD/EPD&C
5504
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS CONTROL SWITCH
J. BACHER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EB-2001-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAYLOAD BAY DOORS CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]




























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CILAND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]










NEW [ X ]
A B
[ P ] [ F ]
[P] [F]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.













NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MECH/PBD/EPD&C
5508




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.











MAIN DC BUS RELAY




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6EB-2005-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MAIN DC BUS RELAY




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]

























[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]









[ P ] [ P ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
MECH/PBD-5504B
05-6EB-2010-I
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MECH/PBD/EPD&C
5504




[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
MECH/PBD-5504C
05-6EB-2010-2
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MECH/PBD/EPD&C
5504
















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6EB-2011-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]





NEW [ X ]
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3505
















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CILAND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.













NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3506
ET UMBILICAL DOOR MODE SWITCH
J. BACHER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
C ] C ] C ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6ED-2026-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






ET UMBILICAL DOOR MODE SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P] [P]
C ] C ] [ ]
CN] CN] CN]
[ x ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6ED-2026-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






ET UMBILICAL DOOR MODE SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CILAND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]











[ P ] [ P ]
CP] CP]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.













NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
CP] [P] [P]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]











[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]











[ P ] [ P ]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]















NEW [ X ]
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3509
ET UMBILICAL DOOR OPEN-CLOSE SWITCH
J. BACHER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.











NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]





NEW [ X ]
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3510
ET UMBILICAL DOOR OPEN-CLOSE SWITCH
J. BACHER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P] [P]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6ED-2030-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






ET UMBILICAL DOOR OPEN-CLOSE SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.











NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]





NEW [ X ]
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3510
ET UMBILICAL DOOR OPEN-CLOSE SWITCH
J. BACHER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P] [P]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6ED-2126-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ Y ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOk [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6ED-2127-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.













NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]







NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.













NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.













NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]




























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]




























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE C I ] C ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]




























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.













NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.













NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] C N ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.



















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/nmC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
c / ] c ] C ] [ ] C J
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDWlFUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ Y ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]




























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYTEM MANAGER.



















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6ED-2251A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x]*
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYTEM MANAGER.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ Y ] [ Y ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYTEM MANAGER.











NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]









NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] C ] C ]
IN] [N] [N]
[ X ] *
[ ]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYTEM MANAGER.














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYTEM MANAGER.













NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]







NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYTEM MANAGER.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYTEM MANAGER.














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]










NEW [ X ]
A B
[P] [F]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYTEMMANAGER.











NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYTEM MANAGER.











NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]









NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYTEM MANAGER.














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]










NEW [ X ]
A B
[ P ] [ F ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYTEM MANAGER.














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]










NEW [ X ]
A B
[P] [F]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CILAND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYTEM MANAGER.














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]




























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CILAND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYTEM MANAGER.











NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]









NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC a B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYTEM MANAGER.














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]










NEW [ X ]
A B
[ P ] [ F ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CILAND IOAANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYTEMMANAGER.














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]





NEW [ X ]
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
11700
FUSE (IA) MOTOR POWER CONTROL
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA # : 05-6EE-2002-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
N_A [i/i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IX]*
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE_TE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DE_TE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.















LEAD ANALYST: A. D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]






FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[x] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.























NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ i /i ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA C 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] C P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.























NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTIONREQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOAHARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.














NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAII//RE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.














NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAII//RE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.














NASA [ 1 /1 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]









C ] C ] [
[ ] C ] C
C ] C ] C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.























NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.





NASA FME #: 05-6EE-2002-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 IIR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE_TE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.





NASA FMEA # : 05-6EE-2002-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST : A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.























NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.















LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST : A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.





NASA FME #: 05-6EE-2002-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
N_A [i/i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] IX]*
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ Y ] [ P ]






FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOAHARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ x] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]







FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
















Nm, [ x ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTIONREQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.














NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DE_TE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DE_TE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOAHARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.























NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.














NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.























NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.














NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[X] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE_TE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE_TE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE_TE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOAHARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE_TE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DE_TE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.





















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [I/I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[X]*
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DE_TE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOAHARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.






















NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[x] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DE_TE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTIONREQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE_TE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.























NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DE_TE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOAHARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DE_TE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.














NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.























NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ i /I ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] C ]
C P ] [ F ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.























NASA [ 1 /1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.















LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOAHARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.













NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]







NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] C ]
CP] CF] [P]
CN] CN] CN]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] C p ] [ F ] [ P ] C A ]
(AD_DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.





NASA FMEA # : 05-6EE-2002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOAHARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] C N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE_TE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.





















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DE_TE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA C 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOAHARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ 3 [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE_TE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST : A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/nmC A 8 C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE_TE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOAHARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.



















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DE_TE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOAHARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.





















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ _ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.























NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.














NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOAHARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.














NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ I /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DE_TE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.














NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST : A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.























NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM FUNCTION REQUIRED TO CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY UPGRADED AFTER
REEVALUATION DUE TO DETERMINATION THAT HARDWARE FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE CANCELLATION OF MISSION.























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N/ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2003-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)




LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2003-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COXPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2003-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2003-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.











NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P] [P]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.














NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DE_TE)




LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2003-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DE_TE)




LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DE_TE)




LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2003-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.












LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]




CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
CP] CP] CP]
C ] [ ] C ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2003-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST" A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.












LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ]
C ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[X]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DE_TE)




LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2003-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2003-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N/ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2003-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2003-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.





















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA C 3 /3 ] C ] C ] C ] C x ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)




LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.














NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2003-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAII//RE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2003-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2003-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT. SECOND FAILURE PRECLUDES OBTAINING
NECESSARY AIR PRESSURE DATA FOR A SAFE DESCENT.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)




UPON FURTHER STUDY SECOND HARDWARE FAILURE DETERMINED TO BE
"READILY APPARENT", THEREFORE PASSING SCREEN B.














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]




























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




UPON FURTHER STUDY SECOND HARDWARE FAILURE DETERMINED TO BE
"READILY APPARENT", THEREFORE PASSING SCREEN B.














NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DE_TE)




UPON FURTHER STUDY SECOND HARDWARE FAILURE DETERMINED TO BE
"READILY APPARENT", THEREFORE PASSING SCREEN B.



















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




UPON FURTHER STUDY SECOND HARDWARE FAILURE DETERMINED TO BE
"READILY APPARENT", THEREFORE PASSING SCREEN B.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




UPON FURTHER STUDY SECOND HARDWARE FAILURE DETERMINED TO BE
"READILY APPARENT", THEREFORE PASSING SCREEN B.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




UPON FURTHER STUDY SECOND HARDWARE FAILURE DETERMINED TO BE
"READILY APPARENT", THEREFORE PASSING SCREEN B.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /ZR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




UPON FURTHER STUDY LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE FOUND TO BE
"READILY APPARENT", PASSING SCREEN B.














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]




























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




UPON FURTHER STUDY LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE FOUND TO BE
"READILY APPARENT", PASSING SCREEN B.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2004-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




UPON FURTHER STUDY LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE FOUND TO BE
"READILY APPARENT", PASSING SCREEN B.



















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




UPON FURTHER STUDY LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE FOUND TO BE
"READILY APPARENT", PASSING SCREEN B.











NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




UPON FURTHER STUDY LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE FOUND TO BE
"READILY APPARENT", PASSING SCREEN B.














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]




























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




UPON FURTHER STUDY LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE FOUND TO BE
"READILY APPARENT", PASSING SCREEN B.














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]






















] [ ] *
] [ ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[313 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


























NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [







[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ 3 [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
3 C ] *
3 [ ]
COMPARE C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2005-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COXPARE [ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ 3 [ 3 [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
















NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)























NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [







C ] C ]
C ] C ]
C ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C 3 / 3 3 C ] C 3 C 3 [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2005-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




UPON FURTHER STUDY FAILURE OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM FOUND TO BE
"READILY APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2005-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ 3 [ N ] [ 3 [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DE_TE)




UPON FURTHER STUDY FAILURE OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM FOUND TO BE
"READILY APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




UPON FURTHER STUDY FAILURE OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM FOUND TO BE
"READILY APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT.



















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




UPON FURTHER STUDY FAILURE OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM FOUND TO BE
"READILY APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT.



















NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)




UPON FURTHER STUDY FAILURE OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM FOUND TO BE
"READILY APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT.














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]




























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




UPON FURTHER STUDY FAILURE OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM FOUND TO BE
"READILY APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT.














NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]













NEW [ X 3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
B C
[ 1 [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]










NEW [ X ]
A B












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]










NEW [ X ]
A B
[ ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
















[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]










NEW [ X ]
A B












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ]
B C
[ ] [ ]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)


















POWER SUPPLY TEST AMP
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
c













NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1629




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS











NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS













HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 3 /3 ] C ] C ] C ] C ] *
IOA C 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS



















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]














[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] ix]
[ ] [ ] [ ] IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]









[ ] [ ] [
C 3 [ ] [
[ 3 C ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] .
] [x]
] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS



















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS



















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]








COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]














[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] IX]
[ ] [ ] [ ] IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS



















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]














[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] [x]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 IIR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]










NEW [ X ]
A B












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]














[ ] C ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] IX]
C ] [ ] [ ] IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS













NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]







NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
C P ] [ F ] C P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DE_TE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS













NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]








CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS














NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]*
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /XR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS













NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]







NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS













NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]







NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS













NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]







NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDWlFUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS













NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]







NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] [F] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS















LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
-[-- ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[P] IF] [P] IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ _ /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS











NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] [ ] C ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] C P ] [ F ] C P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS













NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]







NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P] [ F ] C P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS













NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]







NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS














NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] .
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS














NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS













NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]







NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS

















CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]*
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS













NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /1R ]







NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS











NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]









NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTARENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS













NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]







NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]*
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS













NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]







N_ [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADWDELETE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]









[ ] [ ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS











CRI T ICALI TY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]










NEW [ X ]
A B
[ ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DE_TE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS













NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS













NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]







NEW [ x ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS














NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ].
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]










NEW [ X ]
A B












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS













NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]







NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
N_A [3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]*
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS













NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]







NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P 1 [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ 3 [ ]*
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X 3
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS













NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]






CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS













NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]







NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]









[ ] [ ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADWDE_TE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTARENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS





NASA FME #: 05-6EE-2014-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA TO ADTA RENDERS ADTA INEFFECTIVE.
OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE CONSIDERED READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]




























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]




























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE COULD ALLOW HEATER TO DAMAGE PROBE
CAUSING LOSS OF ADTAS DATA DURING FLIGHT. REVIEW SHOWED LOSS OF
REDUNDANT HARDWARE WAS READILY APPARENT HOWEVER, PASSING SCREEN
B.













NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]







NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
CP] CF] CP]
C ] C ] C ]
IN] [N] IN]
[ x ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE COULD ALLOW HEATER TO DAMAGE PROBE
CAUSING LOSS OF ADTAS DATA DURING FLIGHT. REVIEW SHOWED LOSS OF
REDUNDANT HARDWARE WAS READILY APPARENT HOWEVER, PASSING SCREEN
B.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2016-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DE_TE)




LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE DETERMINED TO BE NOT READILY APPARENT
DURING FLIGHT, THEREFORE DOES NOT PASS SCREEN B.



















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE DETERMINED TO BE NOT READILY APPARENT
DURING FLIGHT, THEREFORE DOES NOT PASS SCREEN B.














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]




























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE DETERMINED TO BE NOT READILY APPARENT
DURING FLIGHT, THEREFORE DOES NOT PASS SCREEN B.














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]









[ P ] [ F ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2016-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]



















[3/3 ] [ ]
[F] [P]
[ ] [ ]
[x]*
[ ]
CO.ARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] C F ] C P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















CRI TI CALI TY
FLIGHT
HDW/nmC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]






















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM NOT DETERMINED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT, THEREFORE NOT PASSING SCREEN B.














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]


















[ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
[F] [P] [X]
[N] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM NOT DETERMINED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT, THEREFORE NOT PASSING SCREEN B.



















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] C P ] C P ] C P ] C ] *
IOA C 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DE_TE)




LOSS OF SECOND HARDWARE ITEM NOT DETERMINED TO BE "READILY
APPARENT" DURING FLIGHT, THEREFORE NOT PASSING SCREEN B.














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]









[ P ] [ F ]
[ ] [ ]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]









[ P ] [ F ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]









[ P ] [ F ]
[ ] [ ]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]














NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FME/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.




















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
















NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]


















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [






















NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]






RADIATOR CONTROL SWITCH ($5/$7)
W.T. SLAUGHTER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] C ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL. ALSO SEE RELATED MDAC ID's 6508,
6509, 6510.











NEW [ X ]
MECH/PBR/EPD&C
6508
RADIATOR CONTROL SWITCH ($5/$7)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL. ALSO SEE RELATED MDAC ID's 6507,
6509, 6510.














RADIATOR CONTROL SWITCH ($5/$7)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N/ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL. ALSO SEE RELATED MDAC IDts 6507,
6508, 6510.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EG-2010-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RADIATOR CONTROL SWITCH (S5/$7)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL. ALSO SEE RELATED MDAC ID's 6507,
6508, 6509.














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]





NEW [ X ]
MECH/PBR/EPD&C
6509








[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL. SEE RELATED MDAC ID 6510.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EG-2010-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RADIATOR CONTROL SWITCH (S5/S7)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CO'ARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL. SEE RELATED MDAC ID 6510.














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]









[ P ] C P ]
[P] CP]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
[x]
[ ]
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.














NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
N_A [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA C 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] C P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)




SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL. SWITCH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING
FLIGHT, PASSING ALL SCREENS.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 IIR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N/N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P ] [ F 3 [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] C ] [ N ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.













NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]







NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[X]*
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.













NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]







NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
N_A [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] C P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL. SWITCH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING
FLIGHT, PASSING ALL SCREENS.














NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N/N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.



















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] C P ] C P ] C x ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] C P ] [ F ] [ P ] C X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] C P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]




























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DE_TE)




SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.



















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]









[ P ] [ P ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.













NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]







NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P] [P]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] CP] CP]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL SWTICH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT,
PASSING ALL SCREENS.














+28V CONTACT # 1




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL. SWITCH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT, PASSING ALL
SCREENS.



















HDW/nmC A S C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL. SWITCH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT, PASSING ALL
SCREENS.























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL. SWITCH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT, PASSING ALL
SCREENS.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N/ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL. SWITCH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT, PASSING ALL
SCREENS.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL. SWITCH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT, PASSING ALL
SCREENS.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL. SWITCH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT, PASSING ALL
SCREENS.














NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL. SWITCH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT, PASSING ALL
SCREENS.





















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL. SWITCH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT, PASSING ALL
SCREENS.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /iR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL. SWITCH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT, PASSING ALL
SCREENS.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL. SWITCH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT, PASSING ALL
SCREENS.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N/N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL. SWITCH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT, PASSING ALL
SCREENS.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF DEPLOY/STOW
CONTROL. SWITCH FAILURE CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT, PASSING ALL
SCREENS.














NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[X]*
[X]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56007-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE (STOW ENABLE CIRCUIT)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[x]*
IX]
COMPARE C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ 1 [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]









[ P ] [ F ]
[ P ] [ F ]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56011-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR (STOW ENABLE SIGNAL)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56011-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR (STOW ENABLE SIGNAL)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ X] *
[X]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IX] *
[X]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56020-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56020-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56020-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IX]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
















NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [A]
(AD_DELETE)




















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]









[ P ] [ F ]
[p] [F]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE LETE )











NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56020-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56020-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IX]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IX]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56020-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56020-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IX]*
IX]
COMPARE C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]









[ P ] [ F ]
[ P ] [ F ]







NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x ] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )











NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56020-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
(ADD/DELETE)




POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW/MISSION VERIFIED UPON FURTHER REVIEW.
LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING
FLIGHT.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56021-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW/MISSION VERIFIED UPON FURTHER REVIEW.
LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING
FLIGHT.











NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
N_A [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW/MISSION VERIFIED UPON FURTHER REVIEW.
LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING
FLIGHT.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56021-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /iR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
CO_PARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW/MISSION VERIFIED UPON FURTHER REVIEW.
LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING
FLIGHT.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE_TE)




POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW/MISSION VERIFIED UPON FURTHER REVIEW.
LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING
FLIGHT.














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]









[ P ] [ F ]
[ P ] [ F ]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW/MISSION VERIFIED UPON FURTHER REVIEW.
LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING
FLIGHT.














NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW/MISSION VERIFIED UPON FURTHER REVIEW.
LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING
FLIGHT.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56021-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW/MISSION VERIFIED UPON FURTHER REVIEW.
LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING
FLIGHT.














NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW/MISSION VERIFIED UPON FURTHER REVIEW.
LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING
FLIGHT.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56021-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW/MISSION VERIFIED UPON FURTHER REVIEW.
LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING
FLIGHT.











NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW/MISSION VERIFIED UPON FURTHER REVIEW.
LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING
FLIGHT.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ Y ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DE_TE)




POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW/MISSION VERIFIED UPON FURTHER REVIEW.
LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING
FLIGHT.














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW/MISSION VERIFIED UPON FURTHER REVIEW.
LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING
FLIGHT.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56021-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ Y ] [ P ]





COMPARE C N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW/MISSION VERIFIED UPON FURTHER REVIEW
LOSS OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT DURING
FLIGHT.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56051-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE (DEPLOY POS. INDICATION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
N_A [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56054-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE (DEPLOYED/XMIT SCAN ENABLE)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[x]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]





NEW [ X ]
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
14697
















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56060-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ ] [ 3 [ 3 [ X 3
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE OF A SINGLE SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET OPEN WOULD NOT CAUSE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION AND NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT
DURING FLIGHT.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




FAILURE OF A SINGLE SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET OPEN WOULD NOT CAUSE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION AND NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT
DURING FLIGHT.













NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]







NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DE_TE)




FAILURE OF A SINGLE SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET OPEN WOULD NOT CAUSE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION AND NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT
DURING FLIGHT.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56060-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
C ] C ] C ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DE_TE)




FAILURE OF A SINGLE SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET OPEN WOULD NOT CAUSE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION AND NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT
DURING FLIGHT.




















CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




FAILURE OF A SINGLE SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET OPEN WOULD NOT CAUSE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION AND NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT
DURING FLIGHT.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56060-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N/ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




FAILURE OF A SINGLE SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET OPEN WOULD NOT CAUSE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION AND NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT
DURING FLIGHT.














NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N/ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE OF A SINGLE SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET OPEN WOULD NOT CAUSE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION AND NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT
DURING FLIGHT.























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




FAILURE OF A SINGLE SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET OPEN WOULD NOT CAUSE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION AND NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT
DURING FLIGHT.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56060-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IX]*
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DE_TE)




FAILURE OF A SINGLE SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET OPEN WOULD NOT CAUSE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION AND NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT
DURING FLIGHT.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56060-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




FAILURE OF A SINGLE SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET OPEN WOULD NOT CAUSE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION AND NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT
DURING FLIGHT.














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]









[ P ] [ NA]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE OF A SINGLE SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET OPEN WOULD NOT CAUSE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION AND NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT
DURING FLIGHT.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56060-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE OF A SINGLE SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET OPEN WOULD NOT CAUSE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION AND NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT
DURING FLIGHT.














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]




























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DE_TE)




FAILURE OF A SINGLE SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET OPEN WOULD NOT CAUSE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION AND NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT
DURING FLIGHT.














NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N/ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




FAILURE OF A SINGLE SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET OPEN WOULD NOT CAUSE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION AND NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT
DURING FLIGHT.























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE OF A SINGLE SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET OPEN WOULD NOT CAUSE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION AND NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT
DURING FLIGHT.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56060-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE OF A SINGLE SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET OPEN WOULD NOT CAUSE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION AND NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT
DURING FLIGHT.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56060-6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




A SINGLE SWITCH POLE SHORT WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. NO "READILY APPARENT" INDICATION OF LOSS OF
REDUNDANT HARDWARE FOUND.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56060-6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SINGLE SWITCH POLE SHORT WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. NO "READILY APPARENT" INDICATION OF LOSS OF
REDUNDANT HARDWARE FOUND.













NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]







NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SINGLE SWITCH POLE SHORT WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. NO "READILY APPARENT" INDICATION OF LOSS OF
REDUNDANT HARDWARE FOUND.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




A SINGLE SWITCH POLE SHORT WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. NO "READILY APPARENT" INDICATION OF LOSS OF
REDUNDANT HARDWARE FOUND.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56060-6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




A SINGLE SWITCH POLE SHORT WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. NO "READILY APPARENT" INDICATION OF LOSS OF
REDUNDANT HARDWARE FOUND.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56060-6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




A SINGLE SWITCH POLE SHORT WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. NO "READILY APPARENT" INDICATION OF LOSS OF
REDUNDANT HARDWARE FOUND.














NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SINGLE SWITCH POLE SHORT WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. NO "READILY APPARENT" INDICATION OF LOSS OF
REDUNDANT HARDWARE FOUND.














NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




A SINGLE SWITCH POLE SHORT WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF SECOND ITEM COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE. NO "READILY APPARENT" INDICATION OF LOSS OF
REDUNDANT HARDWARE FOUND.













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































DOOR CLOSURE MOTOR CL
DOOR CLOSURE MOTOR BR





































































































































































DOOR CLOSURE TORQUE T
DOOR CLOSURE TORQUE T















UPLATCH TORQUE TUBE A






















ET UMBILICAL DOOR MOD
ET UMBILICAL DOOR MOD
ET UMBILICAL DOOR MOD





ET UMBILICAL DOOR OPE
ET UMBILICAL DOOR OPE






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































FAILS OUT OF TOL
FAILS OUT OF TOL
FAILS OUT OF TOL
FAILS OUT OF TOL

























































































































PBD SHEAR FITTING ROL
PBD SHEAR FITTING ROL
PBD SHEAR FITTING ROL
PBD SHEAR FITTING ROL
PBD SHEAR FITTING CLA
PBD SHEAR FITTING CLA
PBD SHEAR FITTING CLA
PBD SHEAR FITTING CLA
BULKHEAD LATCH GANG B











PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV













































FAILS OUT OF TOL
FAILS OUT OF TOL







































































































PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIV
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR ALIG
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR SHEA
CONTROL BUS 1.2K RESI
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS CON
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS CON
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS CON
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS CON
FUSE, IA
MAIN DC BUS RELAY
MAIN DC BUS RELAY
MAIN DC BUS RELAY
MAIN DC BUS RELAY
MAIN DC BUS RELAY
MAIN DC BUS RELAY


























































FAILS OUT OF TOL













































































































































































































































































































































































MCA AC POWER RELAY
MCA AC POWER RELAY






















































































































































MCA AC POWER RELAY
MCA AC POWER RELAY
MCA AC POWER RELAY
MCA AC POWER RELAY
MCA AC POWER RELAY
MCA AC POWER RELAY
MCA AC POWER RELAY















































































































MID MCA I, 2, 3, 4
SIDE HATCH LATCH MECH
SIDE HATCH HINGE
SIDE HATCH ATTENUATOR
AIRLOCK HATCH LATCH M












This appendix contains the IOA analysis worksheets supplementing
previous results reported in STSEOS Working Paper 1.0-WP-VA87001-
03, Analysis of the Mechanical Actuation System, (30 November
1987). Prior results were obtained independently and documented
before starting the FMEA/CIL assessment activity. Supplemental
analysis was performed to address failure modes not previously
considered by the IOA. Each sheet identifies the hardware item
being analyzed, parent assembly and function performed. For each
failure mode possible causes are identified, and hardware and
functional criticality for each mission phase are determined as
described in NSTS 22206, Instructions $or Preparation of FMEA and
CIL, i0 October 1986. Failure mode effects are described at the
bottom of each sheet and worst case criticality is identified at
the top.
LEGEND FOR IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities:
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
Functional Criticalities:
IR = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle.
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission.
Redundancy Screen A:
1 = Is Checked Out PreFlight
2 = Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight
3 = Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight
NA = Not Applicable
Redundancy Screens B and C:
P = Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen
NA = Not Applicable
E-I
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT












SIDE HATCH LATCH MECHANISM
FAILS TO DISENGAGE
















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/I AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /





CAUSES: FOREIGN OBJECTS/DEBRIS, PHYSICAL BINDING JAMMING, PIECE-
PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW/MISSION DURING PRELAUNCH EMERGENCY EGRESS
OR ON-ORBIT IF EMERGENCY CREWMEMBER INGRESS IS REQUIRED. THIS
ITEM NOT IDENTIFIED SEPARATELY IN IOA DATA DROP 2.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-2
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION: MIDDECK
PART NUMBER: V070-593202
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, FOREIGN OBJECTS/DEBRIS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POTENTIAL LOSS OF MISSION/CREW DUE TO LOSS OF INGRESS CAPABILITY
DURING PRELAUNCH EMERGENCY. NOT INCLUDED AS A SEPARATE ITEM IN
IOA DATA DROP 2.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-3
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT












SIDE HATCH ATTENUATOR HINGE
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING













SIDE HATCH ATTENUATOR ASSY
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION: MIDDECK
PART NUMBER: MC252-0002-0001
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, FOREIGN OBJECTS/DEBRIS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POTENTIAL LOSS OF MISSION/CREW DUE TO LOSS OF INGRESS CAPABILITY
DURING ON-ORBIT EMERGENCY OR EGRESS CAPABILITY DURING PRELAUNCH
EMERGENCY. NOT INCLUDED AS A SEPARATE ITEM IN THE IOA DATA DROP
2.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-4
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT







ITEM: AIRLOCK HATCH LATCH MECHANISM
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO DISENGAGE
















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: MIDDECK
PART NUMBER: V075-593301
CAUSES: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POTENTIAL LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO INABILITY TO PERFORM EVA
MISSIONS BECAUSE HATCHES CANNOT BE OPENED.
REFERENCES:














AIRLOCK HATCH LATCH MECHANISM
FAILS TO ENGAGE
















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: MIDDECK
PART NUMBER: V075-593301
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, FOREIGN OBJECTS/DEBRIS, PHYSICAL
BINDING/JAMMING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW/MISSION DUE TO INABILITY TO CLOSE AND SEAL
HATCH B PREVENTING AIRLOCK REPRESSURIZATION. NOT INCLUDED AS A
SEPARATE ITEM IN IOA DATA DROP 2.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-6
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT







ITEM: AIRLOCK HATCH LATCH LOCK
FAILURE MODE: FAILS UNLOCK
















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /





CAUSES: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POTENTIAL LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO INABILITY TO PERFORM EVA
MISSIONS BECAUSE HATCHES CANNOT BE OPENED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-7
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT






























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: i/i ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: V070-594410
CAUSES: ADVERSE TOLERANCES/WEAR, CONTAMINATION/FOREIGN
OBJECT/DEBRIS, DEFECTIVE PART/MATERIAL DEFECT, THERMAL
DISTORTION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:





REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-8
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















BEARING, TORQUE SHAFT SUPPORT
FAILS TO ROTATE
















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: ME131-0051-0009
CAUSES: ADVERSE TOLERANCES/WEAR, CONTAMINATION/FOREIGN OBJECT
DEBRIS, SEIZED BEARING, TEMPERATURE, MISALIGNMENT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW IF RADIATOR CANNOT BE STOWED AND
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS CLOSED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-9
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT












ROLLER ASSEMBLY LATCH RADIATOR
FAILS TO ENGAGE



























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC203-0002-0012, 19, 32, 39
C [ P ]







REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-10
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









SWITCH MODULE, LIMIT, RADIATOR STOWED
SHORTS, PREMATURELY CLOSES, CONDUCTS INADVERTENTLY
















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: ME452-0123-0003
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SECOND FAILURE MAY PREVENT STOWAGE OF RADIATORS RESULTING IN IN
ABILITY TO CLOSE PAYLOAD BAY DOORS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-11
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT












































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: ME451-0018-0100
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE REDUNDANT AIR DATA PROBE MOTOR. SECOND LOSS WOULD
CAUSE LOSS OF PROBE CONTROL. NOT IDENTIFIED PRIOR TO DATA DROP
2.
REFERENCES: ADS DRAWING 9.9 REV. C
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-12
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT




























SWITCH SCAN - LIMIT RESISTOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /





NO EFFECT ON PROBE OPERATION.
2.
NOT IDENTIFIED PRIOR TO DATA DROP
REFERENCES: ADS DRAWING 9.9 REV. C
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-13
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























LIMIT SWITCH - LIMIT RESISTOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3





A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT IN AIR DATA PROBE OPERATION.
DATA DROP 2.
NOT IDENTIFIED PRIOR TO
REFERENCES: ADS DRAWING 9.9 REV. C
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-14
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























DEPLOY/HEAT - DEPLOY SWITCH OUTPUT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE AFTER LOSS OF OTHER REDUNDANT
CIRCUIT HARDWARE. NOT FOUND PRIOR TO DATA DROP 2.
REFERENCES: ADS DRAWING 9.9 REV. C
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-15
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT






























DEPLOY/HEAT - DEPLOY SWITCH OUTPUT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE UPON LOSS OF OTHER ADDITIONAL
REDUNDANT CIRCUIT HARDWARE. NOT IDENTIFIED PRIOR TO DATA DROP 2.
REFERENCES: ADS DRAWING 9.9 REV. C
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-16
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT














LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA PROBE























CAUSES: THERMAL, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




REFERENCES: ADS DRAWING 9.9 REV. C
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-17
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT














FAILURE MODE: OPEN (ELECTRICAL)













DEPLOY/HEAT - DEPLOY SWITCH SCAN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] S[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE UPON LOSS OF OTHER, ADDITIONAL
REDUNDANT HARDWARE IN THE CIRCUIT. NOT IDENTIFIED PRIOR TO DATA
DROP 2.
REFERENCES: ADS DRAWING 9.9 REV. C
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-18
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] c[P]
LOCATION: HEATER CONTROL ASSEMBLY
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE UPON LOSS OF OTHER, ADDITIONAL
HARDWARE IN THE CIRCUIT. NOT IDENTIFIED IN DATA DROP 2.
REFERENCES: ADS DRAWING 9.9 REV. C
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-19
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT





















































CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE UPON LOSS OF OTHER ADDITIONAL
HARDWARE IN THE CIRCUIT. NOT IDENTIFIED IN DATA DROP 2.
REFERENCES: ADS DRAWING 9.9 REV. C
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-20
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: W. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: ME451-009-I001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT - FIRST FAILURE - POSSIBLE VEHICLE LOSS AFTER SECOND
FAILURE AND INABILITY TO STOW RADIATORS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-21
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/25/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 16516 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: MID MCA i, 2, 3, 4
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO TRANSFER, FAILS TO CONDUCT, SHORTS TO
GROUND (DC SIDE)













MID MCA i, 2, 3, 4
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: ME455-0135-0001, -0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURA FAILURE, VIBRATION,
THERMAL STRESS, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE LOSS IF VEHICLE/CREW AFTER SECOND FAILURE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-22
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT































DEPLOY CONTROL CIRCUIT (MCA2 & 4)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: MID MCA2 & 4
PART NUMBER: JANTXVlN4246
CAUSES: THERMAL, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. ADDITIONAL FAILURES COULD CAUSE INADVERTENT
DEPLOY OF THE KU-BAND ANTENNA, DAMAGING ORBITER PLB
DOORS/RADIATORS. ITEM NOT IDENTIFIED IN IOA DATA DROP 2.
REFERENCES: NASA DRAWING 15.7A, REV. C
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-23
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT































BOOM STOW ENABLE (MCA2 & 4)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID MCA2 & 4
JANTXVlN4246
CAUSES: THERMAL, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT AFTER FIRST FAILURE. ADDITIONAL FAILURES IN
CONJUCTION COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO
CLOSE PLB DOORS WHEN ANTENNA IS DEPLOYED. NOT IDENTIFIED IN IOA
DATA DROP 2.
REFERENCES: NASA DRAWING 15.7A, REV. C
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-24
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT































STOW SIGNAL CIRCUIT (MCA2 & 4)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID MCA2 & 4
RWRSOSI211FR
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT ON FIRST FAILURE. ADDITIONAL FAILURES IN
CONJUNCTION COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO
CLOSE PLB DOORS. NOT IDENTIFIED IN IOA DATA DROP 2.
REFERENCES: NASA DRAWING 15.7A, REV. C
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-25
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT













ITEM: RESISTOR (STOW SIGNAL)
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED














STOW SIGNAL CIRCUIT (MCA2 & 4)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: MID MCA2 & 4
PART NUMBER: RWR80SI211FR
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT FROM FIRST FAILURE. ADDITIONAL FAILURES IN CONJUNCTION
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CLOSE PLB
DOORS. NOT IDENTIFIED IN IOA DATA DROP 2.
REFERENCES: NASA DRAWING 15.7A, REV. C
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-26
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT













ITEM: RESISTOR (STOW ENABLE SIGNAL)
FAILURE MODE: OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:











STOW ENABLE CIRCUIT (MCA2 & 4)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: MID MCA2 & 4
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4246
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT FROM FIRST FAILURE. ADDITIONAL FAILURES IN CONJUNCTION
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CLOSE PLB
DOORS. NOT IDENTIFIED IN IOA DATA DROP 2.
REFERENCES: NASA DRAWING 15.7A, REV. C
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-27
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT































STOW ENABLE CIRCUIT (MCA2 & 4)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: MID MCA2 & 4
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4246
B [ F ] C [ P 3
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT FROM FIRST FAILURE. ADDITIONAL FAILURES IN CONJUNCTION
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CLOSE PLB
DOORS. NOT IDENTIFIED IN IOA DATA DROP 2.
REFERENCES: NASA DRAWING 15.7A, REV. C
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-28
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE (DEPLOY POS. INDICATION)
SHORTED














DEPLOY POSITION INDICATOR CIRCUIT (MCA2 & 4)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID MCA2 & 4
JANTXVlN4246
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT FROM FIRST FAILURE. ADDITIONAL FAILURES IN CONJUNCTION
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO POSSIBLE
INADVERTENT/PREMATURE DEPLOYMENT OF THE ANTENNA, DAMAGING ORBITER
STRUCTURE. NOT IDENTIFIED IN IOA DATA DROP 2.
REFERENCES: NASA DRAWING 15.7A, REV. C
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-29
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT













ITEM: DIODE (DEPLOYED/XMIT SCAN ENABLE)
FAILURE MODE: OPEN (ELECTRICAL)














DEPLOY/XMIT SCAN ENABLE CIRCUIT (MCA2 & 4)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID MCA2 & 4
JANTXVIN4246
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT FROM FIRST FAILURE. ADDITIONAL FAILURES IN
CONJUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF
STATE VECTOR UPDATE CAPABILITY. NOT IDENTIFIED IN IOA DATA DROP
2.
REFERENCES: NASA DRAWING 15.7A, REV. C
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-30
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE (DEPLOYED/XMIT SCAN ENABLE)
SHORTED














DEPLOY/XMIT SCAN ENABLE CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID MCA2 & 4
JANTXVlN4246
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT FROM FIRST FAILURE. ADDITIONAL FAILURES IN
CONJUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF
STATE VECTOR UPDATE CAPABILITY. NOT IDENTIFIED IN IOA DATA DROP
2.
REFERENCES: NASA DRAWING 15.7A, REV. C
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-31
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT













ITEM: FUSE (DEPLOY/XMIT SCAN ENABLE)
FAILURE MODE: OPEN (ELECTRICAL)














DEPLOY INDICATION/XMIT SCAN ENABLE CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: MID MCA2 & 4
PART NUMBER: ME451-0018-0200
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT FROM FIRST FAILURE. ADDITIONAL FAILURES IN
CONJUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO THE
INABILITY TO PROVIDE STATE VECTOR UPDATE CAPABILITY. NOT
IDENTIFIED IN IOA DATA DROP 2.
REFERENCES: NASA DRAWING 15.7A, REV. C
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-32
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT































STOW INITIATE CIRCUIT (MCA2 & 4)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID MCA2 & 4
JANTXVIN4246
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT FROM FIRST FAILURE. ADDITIONAL FAILURES IN CONJUNCTION
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO CLOSE PLB
DOORS WITHOUT CAUSING STRUCTURAL DAMAGE TO DOORS. NOT INCLUDED
IN THE IOA DATA DROP 2.
REFERENCES: NASA DRAWING 15.7A, REV. C
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-33
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT































STOW INITIATE CIRCUIT (MCA2 & 4)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: MID MCA2 & 4
PART NUMBER: ME451-0009-I001
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT FROM FIRST FAILURE. ADDITIONAL FAILURES IN CONJUNCTION
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO THE INABILITY TO CLOSE
PLB DOORS WITHOUT STRUCTURAL DAMAGE TO THE DOORS. NOT INCLUDED
IN THE IOA DATA DROP 2.
REFERENCES: NASA DRAWING 15.7A, REV. C
REPORT DATE 03/07/88 E-34
APPENDZX F
NP, BA FHEA TO ZOA WORKSHEET CR088 REFERENCE/RECONNENDATION8
This section provides a cross reference between the NASA FMEA and
corresponding IOA analysis worksheet(s) included in Appendix E.
The Appendix F identifies: NASA FMEA Number, IOA Assessment
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